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Evaluations of government Technology Development Funds (TDFs) in Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and Panama are surveyed. All the evaluations were done at the recipient (firm) level using data 
from innovation surveys, industrial surveys, and administrative records of the granting units, 
together with quasi-experimental econometric techniques to minimize the effects of any selection 
bias. TDF effectiveness is found to depend on the financing mechanism used, on the presence of 
non-financial constraints, on firm-university interaction, and on the characteristics of the target 
beneficiaries. Four levels of potential impact were considered: R&D input additionality, 
behavioural additionality, increases in innovative output, and improvements in performance. The 
evidence suggests that TDF do not crowd out private investment and that they positively affect 
R&D intensity. In addition, participation in TDF induces a more proactive attitude of beneficiary 
firms towards innovation activities. However, the analysis does not find much statistically 
significant impact on patents or new product sales and the evidence on firm performance is mixed, 
with positive results in terms of firm growth, but little corresponding positive impact on measures 
of firm productivity, possibly because the horizon over which the evaluation was conducted was 
too short.  
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In recent years the role of Science and Technology (S&T) in growth has gained 
preeminence in the public policy dialogue of Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) 
Countries and it has become a central topic in the competitiveness agenda of multilateral 
organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the 
Organization of American States. During the 1990s, LAC policy makers instituted and 
expanded a number of S&T programs aimed at supporting the effort to regain 
competitiveness. These programs were generally built around a demand-driven model, 
that is, they relied on program participants to suggest and implement projects.  
Given the increasing relevance of S&T policy for the region, the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) undertook an evaluation of the impact of a sample of IDB’s 
Science and Technology Programs in order to assess the impact of the two policy 
instruments most frequently financed by the IDB: i) Competitive Research Grants (CRG) 
for financing basic research activities, which are usually carried out by academic 
institutions; and ii) Technology Development Funds (TDF), targeted towards innovation 
activities in the productive sector.
1 This paper summarizes the findings from the 
evaluation of the second policy instrument (TDF), covering the evaluations of TDF in 
four Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Panama.
2  
All these evaluations were done at the recipient level using data drawn from innovation 
and industrial surveys combined with the administrative records of the units that 
administer the TDF. Given the absence of randomized experiments, the studies estimated 
the impact of the TDF using quasi-experimental techniques applied to comparable 
participating and non-participating firms in order to minimize the effects of any selection 
bias. Four levels of potential impact were considered: R&D input additionality, 
behavioural additionality, increases in innovative output, and improvements in 
performance.  
In terms of input additionality, the evidence suggests that TDF do not crowd out private 
R&D investment and that they positively affect R&D intensity. In two cases (Argentina 
and Brazil), the TDF even produce multiplier effects on R&D. The results also suggest 
that different financing mechanisms have differential impacts on firms, with low cost 
credit for R&D projects having a clearer positive impact than matching grants. However, 
the studies also found that for some groups of beneficiaries - notably new innovators and 
small firms – matching grants seem to be more effective.  
Behavioral additionality is defined as changes in firm innovation strategy induced by the 
TDF. The empirical results suggest that the participation in TDF does produce a more 
proactive attitude of beneficiary firms towards innovation activities. Although in this case 
data are available only for Chile and Panama, the evidence suggests that the TDF 
                                                 
1 This evaluation was conducted by the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) during the 2005 ex post 
evaluation cycle.  
2 For detail on the individual studies see: Benavente et al. (2007), Binelli and Maffioli (2006), Chudnovsky 
et al. (2006), De Negri et al. (2006a and 2006b) and IDB (2007). Preliminary results on a TDF in Colombia 
are also available in OCyT (2007). 
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knowledge and financing, which are proxies for changes in the firms’ innovation strategy. 
In terms of innovative output, the results are more disappointing. In almost all the cases 
the analyses did not find statistically significant impacts on conventional measures of 
innovative output, such as patent grants and new product sales, although it is possible that 
not enough time had elapsed between the subsidy to observe its full effects. The results 
are more encouraging when patent applications are considered, although only the 
Brazilian FNDCT evaluation had such data available to it.  
In terms of firm performance the evidence is mixed. There are positive impacts on firm 
growth, but there are no corresponding positive impacts on measures of firm productivity. 
However, there are two reasons to expect fairly weak results in the case of innovative 
output and performance: first, the impacts have been measured over a fairly short time 
period. Second, as we show in the next section, if the TDF are working correctly, the rate 
of return to innovation for firms receiving subsidies should fall, which implies that the 
direct and immediate effects may be rather small.  
Although this review has to be considered as a first step in a wider and more intense 
effort of understanding the effectiveness of the TDF, the results do suggest the need for a 
more accurate targeting of this instrument. The TDF design and implementation have to 
be based on a more tailored assessment of the country specific market failures and of 
firms’ constraints. In addition, the qualitative evidence suggests that financial support 
should be complemented with technological services and infrastructure, such as those 
provided by universities and research centers. 
This paper is structured into six sections. After this brief introduction, section 2 presents 
the rationale for promoting innovation through R&D subsidies and discusses the impacts 
we might expect to find. Section 3 provides a review of the recent evolution of S&T 
sector and policy framework in LAC and the role of the IDB in this framework. Section 4 
summarizes the evaluative framework, presenting the questions of interest, the indicators 
and data sources and the methodological approach followed. Finally, section 5 presents 
the empirical results and section 6 gives some concluding remarks. 
2.  The Rationale for Promoting Innovation through R&D Subsidies 
The prime justification for promoting firm investments in R&D through public financing 
is related to the need to correct market failures in innovative effort arising from financial 
constraints and the lack of appropriability.
3 In addition, evolutionary scholars argue that 
public intervention is also justified by the need to address issues related to the dynamic, 
collective and uncertain nature of the innovation process, such as the linkages among and 
absorptive capacity of the agents of the National Innovation System (NIS).  
A financially constrained firm cannot undertake certain potentially profitable innovation 
projects because asymmetric information and moral hazard problems increase the cost of 
credit, making some marginal projects infeasible or unattractive (Hall 2002). Even for 
                                                 
3 As first described by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), to the extent that knowledge cannot be kept secret, 
the returns from investing in the production of science and technology cannot be fully appropriated by the 
investor; the private returns associated with an investment in S&T are therefore much lower than the social 
ones.  
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innovation to the firm via cost-sharing.  
Although the provision of subsidized financial resources can generally help firms to 
overcome financial constraints, the effectiveness of this policy may be limited by the 
presence of rent seekers. When a firm’s preferences are not observable, the provision of 
subsidized financial resources will incur the risk of attracting and financing firms that 
have already reached their desired level of R&D investment and seek low-cost public 
resources for other types of investments.
4 In this case, the potential positive effect of the 
public financing is undone by an internal transfer of resources, displacing private funds 
for other investments and no increase in R&D spending. As Wallsten (2000) states, if 
R&D investment has short-run diminishing returns and the firm has an equilibrium level 
of R&D investment funded with its own funds, public funding will cause the firm to 
reduce its own expenditure by the whole amount of the subsidy and its total R&D 
investment would remain unchanged. 
A number of policy instruments are commonly used to address appropriability problems 
and financial constraints in innovation. These include public subsidies (grants and 
matching grants), targeted credit, tax incentives, and the intellectual property system. The 
first two (grants and credit) are the instruments reviewed in this paper. In both cases they 
are targeted towards R&D investment in the countries considered. It is useful to review 
the implications of economic theory for the behavior of firms receiving these two 
different types of subsidies. The first and most important result is that because the 
subsidies are designed to reduce the cost of R&D capital, the marginal rate of return to 
R&D in the firms receiving them should fall, not rise. This counterintuitive result is 
important to keep in mind when looking at the performance results of the subsidies.  
The two different types of subsidy will also have different effects that depend on the 
financial position of the firms receiving them. To see this, assume that each firm faces a 
downward sloping demand for R&D and a supply cost of R&D capital that is flat until 
internal funds for R&D investment are exhausted, then jumps up to the cost of external 
funds, increasing as more and more external funds are needed. Absent the subsidies, each 
firm does R&D at the level where the demand and supply curves intersect. This situation 
is shown in Figures 1a and 1b: the curve labeled S is the supply of funds and D1 through 
D4 represent the demand for funds by firms with various levels of financial constraint.  
The curve S′ in Figure 1s illustrates the effect of a (project neutral) matching grant that 
lowers the cost of financing below the cost of internal funds for R&D spending up to the 
amount of the grant and increases the point at which internal funds are exhausted by the 
amount of the matching grant.
5 In the example shown, the agency matches the recipient 
spending one for one, the cost to the recipient of each additional currency unit spent on 
the project will be halved. The effect will vary for the fout different types of firms: firm 1 
was not doing R&D before, and the matching grant will induce it to undertake R&D. 
Firm 2 will substitute the funds from the matching grant for its own and will not increase 
                                                 
4 On the so-called crowding out effect see David et al. 2000, Klette et al. 2000 and Chudnovsky et al. 2006. 
5 This analysis assumes that the R&D project is a relatively small fraction of the firm’s R&D spending. In 
the case where the firm does little R&D other than that associated with the project, the effect of the grant 
will be to induce the firm to undertake R&D. 
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does not really generate any deadweight loss, given the costs of capital and the rates of 
return. Firm 3 (slightly financially constrained) will probably find that its cost of capital 
has dropped significantly on the margin and therefore ought to increase its investment 
significantly. On the other hand, firm 3 (very financially constrained), will see a smaller 
fall in the cost of capital and will therefore increase its R&D only slightly.  
[Figure 1a about here] 
The picture for credit subsidies is slightly more complex, depending on whether the 
subsidies lower the cost of capital below the cost of internal funds or not. If not, then 
firms 1 and 2 will not change their behavior, nor will they apply for funds. Firm 3 will 
increase its R&D slightly and firm 4 will increase its R&D more (because the decline in 
capital cost will be greater). On the other hand, as illustrated by S′ in Figure 1b, if the 
new cost of capital lies below the cost of internal funds up to some spending limit, firm 2 
will see crowding out and the result will be similar to the case of matching grants. For 
firms 3 and 4, the result is similar to the case where the cost of capital with the credit 
subsidy is above the cost of internal funds.  
[Figure 1b about here] 
The conclusion is that crowding out is a possibility for firms that rely on internal funds 
for investment, but unlikely for those that are financially constrained. Although in the 
latter case, they can always divert funds to other (non-R&D) projects, given the lowered 
cost of capital, it would probably not be rational to do so. A second conclusion is that 
matching grants are likely to have more impact on firms that are only slightly constrained, 
because they simply remove the constraint, whereas credit subsidies are effective over a 
wider range of financially constrained firms, depending on the size of the loans for which 
they are available. Finally, in all cases, the observed rate of return to R&D is expected to 
stay the same or to fall.  
There are several caveats to this analysis. First, it has assumed that both the grants and 
the credit are completely project-neutral, in the sense that they are not chosen to favor 
those with a high social rate of return or a high gap between the social and private rates. 
It has also assumed that the firms are free to spend the funds in any way they wish, once 
they have received them. If socially beneficial projects are to be favored in the selection 
process, it will also be necessary to monitor the firm's activities carefully, as the 
incentives to shift the funds to other activities are greater in the case where the 
opportunity cost of funds exceeds the private returns from a particular project.  
Finally, the analysis above is essentially static and ignores learning and other dynamics. 
One important effect of these instruments is to ease the firm’s transition into a more 
innovative state, at which point its own R&D demand curve may shift out, and the supply 
curve of funds may also shift out, due to increased internal funds and greater familiarity 
with and reputation in the financial markets. These effects could be important, but are not 
easily captured by the short period of data available in these evaluations.  
3.  S&T Sector and Innovation Policy in Latin America and Caribbean  
This section briefly assesses the recent evolution of S&T sector and policy framework in 
Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC). The discussion focuses, in particular, on the 
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geographical areas, and on the policies put in place by the LAC governments in order to 
respond to these challenges. Much of the evolution of S&T policy in the region has 
developed in tandem with shifts in the policy focus and strategy of the IDB, as will 
become clear. 
Recent evidence suggests that the S&T sector in Latin America has been progressing in 
absolute terms but falling behind in relative terms.
6 This statement certainly holds when 
input variables such as R&D investment levels are observed: according to the UNESCO 
science report in 2005 (UNESCO 2005), LAC economies account for just a small fraction 
of the world expenditure in R&D and this share has even contracted between 1997 and 
2003 (from 3.1% to 2.6%). Overall investment in R&D has always been low in the LAC 
region and it has not significantly improved over time. Between 1991 and 2003 the R&D 
investment rate increased only slightly (from 0.49% to 0.57% of GDP). Consequently, 
not only has the gap with highly developed economies not narrowed,
7 but the region has 
also fallen behind other emerging areas such as East Asia and Eastern Europe, where in 
2003 the R&D/GDP ratio reached 1.2% and 0.97% respectively.  
In particular, the LAC economies have historically experienced a low participation of the 
productive sector in R&D investment. The limited innovative effort of firms has become 
more of a concern as many of the regional economies have shifted their development 
strategy from the traditional “import-substitution industrialization” (ISI) to an open-
market approach at the beginning of the 1990s. Although the LAC governments expected 
an overall net benefit from opening up their economies, they also acknowledged that the 
potential cost of adjustment depended on the firms’ capability to adapt to a completely 
new business environment. 
Why do the LAC economies and, in particular, LAC firms tend to under-invest in R&D? 
Recent studies clearly rule out the argument that low R&D expenditures and limited 
participation of the productive sector in innovation activities are the consequence of low 
rates of return to these kinds of investments (Laderman and Moloney 2003, De Ferranti 
2003, and Benavente et al. 2005). Lederman and Maloney (2003) find rates of return to 
R&D that are higher for developing countries – principally in LAC and Asia – than for 
advanced countries.
8 They then observe that since these returns far exceed those of 
physical capital, LAC economies should be investing over twice what they presently do.
9 
Therefore, evidence suggests that the low private R&D investment in the LAC countries 
depends on other factors (Lederman and Maloney 2003 and De Ferranti 2004): (i) short 
planning horizons brought on by persistent macro volatility; (ii) financial constraints; (iii) 
weak intellectual property rights; (iv) low quality of research institutions; (v) failure to 
                                                 
6 Many surveys on this topic have been recently produced. For a detailed discussion see, among others: 
IDB 2001, ECLAC 2004, Velho 2004 and Hall 2005. 
7 In 2003, R&D accounted for 2.62% and 1.7% of the GDP in the US and Europe respectively (Sources: 
RICYT, 2006 and UNESCO, 2005).  
8 The estimated social return rate of R&D in Latin America approaches 60% for medium income countries 
such as Chile and Mexico, and 100% for relatively poor countries such as Nicaragua. 
9 At global interest rates of 7 percent, the number is closer to 10 times. 
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history of passive natural resource exploitation. 
Lack of skilled human resources has always imposed serious constraints on LAC 
innovation systems. In spite of some general achievements in terms of literacy, 
enrollment and tertiary education, recent studies (De Ferranti et al 2003, Velho 2004, and 
Hall 2005) point out that the average educational attainment in many LAC Countries is 
still low and that education is distributed less equitably that in other emerging regions. In 
many LAC countries tertiary and secondary education are unbalanced, the latter being too 
low relative to the former, and LAC students still perform poorly in international 
comparison tests, especially in math. This unbalanced education system partially explains 
the limited Latin-American capacity of absorbing new technology. In fact, although 
tertiary education generates a stock of scientists and engineers in line with the income 
level of LAC economies, secondary education has failed to provide the workforce with 
up-to-date technical knowledge. To make this problem even worse, only a small share of 
researchers and scientists works in the productive sector (around 11% in most countries) 
while the majority works in public and academic sectors. 
Regional performance in terms of R&D outputs is consistent with the allocation of effort 
at the input level. On one hand, the region has experienced non negligible improvements 
in the productivity of scientists and researchers. Figure 1 in the appendix clearly shows 
that a partial catching up has occurred in terms of scientific production (both when 
publications are weighted by number of researchers and when weighted by GDP). On the 
other hand, the results in terms of innovative output related to the productive sector are 
much more disappointing: the number of patent applications filed annually by LAC 
residents increased very slowly between 1991 and 2005 (2.6% per year according to 
RICYT 2006 data
10) and the gap with developed economies increased. 
The World Bank’s “knowledge for development” indicators provide further evidence of 
the relative decline in LAC performance. Table A1 in the appendix shows that the overall 
“knowledge divide” between the region and the G7 economies widened between 1995 
and 2003.
11 LAC is the only emerging area that experienced an increasing gap in the 
innovation indicator, while it has slightly improved in terms of education and information 
technology. Obviously enough, the cross country heterogeneity is strong: among the 
upper middle income economies of the Region, only Chile reduced the gap in all the 
indicators, and even rose above the G7 benchmark in terms of economic incentive and 
institutional regime (EIR). Brazil was the most dynamic lower middle income country, 
even though its catching up process was limited by the worsening of EIR. 
What has been the policy response of LAC governments? During the import substitution 
industrialization stage, LAC governments, supported by the IDB, attempted to expand 
their innovation capacity by focusing on the supply side of the research and innovation 
processes. Assuming a linear model of innovation from basic research to applied research 
to successfully commercialized new products, governments focused on the promotion of 
scientific research activities. According to this model, a critical mass of high quality 
                                                 
10 Available online at http://www.ricyt.edu.ar
11 Note that the change in the gap between the two periods is defined as ∆ = [GAP2003-GAP1995], so that a 
negative sign on the change implies worsening performance on the index. 
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transferred from public research organizations to the productive sector. In this context, 
public administrators and representatives of the scientific community decided on the 
allocation of public resources on the basis of national development priorities, with little 
or no consideration of the demand for the new technologies. (Velho 2004 and ECLAC 
2004). As a result, public investments were concentrated on the creation of public 
research infrastructure and on sectors dominated by state-owned enterprises - such as 
energy, telecommunications, transport and aeronautics - or those connected to public 
technology institutes – such as agriculture, nuclear, mining and forestry (ECLAC 2004).  
At this very first stage, the organizational structure adopted by most of the LAC countries 
provided for the central role of research councils and national research institutes. These 
organizations, usually controlled by the scientific and academic community, were 
responsible for both the planning and implementation of the S&T policy.
12 The research 
itself was then performed by public research centers, universities, and national 
technology institutes. The absence of rigorous inter-agency coordination efforts severely 
limited the effectiveness of these policies and usually led to fragmentation, duplication 
and overlapping of initiatives (ECLAC 2004 and Velho 2004).  
From the end of the 1980s, the majority of LAC governments have adopted a new 
approach, based on horizontal policies to be guided by the actual demand of the 
productive sector for innovation. The supply side approach to research funding began to 
be replaced by the use of market incentives and the policy focus shifted towards the 
needs of the productive sector. More horizontal and neutral policies towards funding have 
been introduced in order to let the market dictate the direction of spending. Priority has 
been given to instruments that foster the demand for knowledge by final users and that 
support the transfer of technological know-how to the production sector. The allocation 
of public resources shifted significantly towards instruments that supported innovation 
activities in response to proposals by the firms. The structure and size of financing of the 
scientific research sector changed dramatically: resources devoted to research 
infrastructure were significantly reduced in favor of those allocated to innovative 
activities more broadly. The remaining resources devoted to science were primarily 
channeled towards direct support to scientists based on quality, and, to some extent, on 
the promotion of linkages with the production sector. 
To support this new approach, governments introduced many changes to the 
organizational structure of the S&T sectors. Many countries undertook a significant 
process of reorganization with the purpose of more efficiently dividing responsibilities 
and tasks among public institutions. According to the IDB (2001), the new structure 
should have been based on a clear separation of the political planning functions from the 
execution and implementation functions and, within the latter, the financing from 
performing activities.
13 At the top of the organizational pyramid, central government 
                                                 
12 In cases such as the Argentinean CONICET, the council was not only responsible for the definition of 
political guidelines and the allocation of resources, but also directly carried out research activities.  
13 According to The Economic and Social Progress Report 2001 of the Inter-American Development 
Bank(IDB 2001), the new organizational structures should have included: “(i) a central government agency 
in charge of defining S&T policy; (ii) a set of executing agencies; (iii) institutions (including public and 
private universities) in charge of basic and applied research; (iv) institutions responsible for defining 
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councils became responsible for the implementation through the coordination of the 
funding mechanisms. In some countries (Brazil, Costa Rica and Venezuela), this led to 
the creation of Ministries of Science and Technology, while in others, the policymaking 
authority was assigned to special divisions within other ministries.
14 In yet other (smaller) 
countries, the national research councils, usually under the direct supervision of the 
presidency of the republic, have maintained their original role (Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama and Paraguay). 
Following this change in emphasis, in the 1990s the IDB’s approach to S&T policy also 
shifted towards horizontal and demand driven policies, responding to the increasing LAC 
need to maintain or regain competitiveness in a new economic environment. Within this 
context, technology development funds emerged as the key instrument of the new S&T 
policy. The transition from a supply side approach to a demand driven one occurred with 
the implementation of programs such as the Chilean Science and Technology Program 
(1991), and the Colombian Science and Technology Research Promotion Program (1989). 
Indeed, FONTEC of Chile and COLCIENCIAS of Colombia rapidly became points of 
reference for subsequent IDB operations.
15
Although this instrument varies significantly in terms of targeting, operational 
mechanisms and administration rules, recent reviews identify two main technology fund 
systems in Latin-America (ECLAC 2004). The first system (implemented in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico) allocates resources exclusively on the 
basis of firm technology demand. The second system (adopted by Brazil, Chile and 
Colombia) requires the coordination between supply (academic institutions and research 
centers) and demand (enterprises). In either case, competition among project proposals 
from the potential beneficiaries plays a central role in determining the priorities and 
resource allocation of the TDF, in line with a horizontal and demand driven approach to 
funding. 
3.1  The design and goals of the TDF 
The TDF funds operated with features and modalities that varied across the countries and 
the region over time. A brief review of the funds supported by the IDB reveals six main 
features of this instrument: (i) a demand driven approach; (ii) implemented via subsidy; 
(iii) co-financing; (iv) evolution from neutral to targeted; (v) competitive allocation of 
resources; and (vi) execution by a specialized agency.  
(i)  Demand-driven approach: in the early 1990s IDB operations supported funds 
that exclusively financed projects designed and submitted by final users. 
Therefore, the beneficiary demand determined the policy priorities and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
technical norms, standards, quality control and certification; (v) institutions in charge of technical and 
vocational education as well as short term training of the labor force; and (vi) financial institutions and 
funding agencies”.  
14 The Ministry of Planning in Colombia, the Ministry of Education in Argentina, Mexico, Peru and 
Uruguay, and the Ministry of Economics in Chile, El Salvador and Nicaragua. 
15 The IDB projects frequently mention the FONTEC and COLCIENCIAS as benchmarks for other 
operations in the region (see, for example, the loan proposal of the operations in Argentina, Panama, 
Uruguay and Venezuela).  
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emphasis on the demand by also financing service providers, such as 
technology service centres.  
(ii)  Subsidies: grants and matching-grants have become the common financing 
method of the IDB funds, while over time the Bank has abandoned other 
means of subsidizing innovation projects, such as conditional credit lines.
16  
(iii)  Co-financing: the funds never cover all costs of the financed projects. They 
always require the beneficiaries to participate in the financing of the initiative, 
usually on an equal cost-sharing basis.  
(iv)  Evolution from neutral to targeted: although in the early 1990s IDB funds 
were designed on a principle of non-discrimination, later on the funds adopted 
more targeted approaches. Different justifications supported the initial 
preference for neutrality. From the free market perspective, neutrality aimed at 
not interfering with the market resource allocation. In a more evolutionary 
perspective, the initial neutrality aimed at facilitating a policy adjustment 
process. In the first phase, the governments needed to identify the industry-
specific externalities and market failures. This exploratory neutral approach 
was intended to allow developing more targeted policies in a second stage. 
Further, in the early stages the massive and flexible support to innovation 
activities aimed at facilitating the “endogenization and routinization” of R&D 
in the productive sector (Teubal 1996, 1998, 2002).  
(v)  Competition in the allocation of resources: the early 1990s IDB funds 
operated on the basis of an “open-window” mechanism, where firms could 
apply at any time and were not competing directly with other firms for funds, 
except to the extent that earlier applications were more likely to be funded. 
Later the funds adopted competitive mechanisms such as calls for innovation 
project proposals.  
(vi)  Execution by a specialized public agency: although the institutional setting for 
the funds’ execution differs on a across countries and operations basis, many 
funds are operated by an independent specialized organization. Over time, this 
tendency has generated some concerns about the coordination between 
different agencies and the definition of roles within the sector.  
Table 1 summarizes the TDF studied in this evaluation. It is worth noticing that the 
FNDCT is the only TDF evaluated that exclusively promotes partnership between firms 
and research institutions (i.e. universities and research centers.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Because they are neutral with respect to the projects that can be proposed, TDF mainly 
address market failures related to financial constraints and only incidentally those related 
specifically to lack of appropriability, although project selection does take account of 
social returns in some cases. To tackle asymmetric information and adverse selection 
                                                 
16 In this method, loans could be partially or even totally forgiven on the basis of three criteria: the success 
or failure of the project; the nature of the beneficiary; and, the level of the project technological risk. 
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selecting the innovation projects from among the proposals submitted. The role of this 
agency is at least three-fold: first, the agency acts as a screener, conveying the technical 
knowledge that the financial markets lack or are not willing to develop. This process 
should reduce the usual asymmetry of information between the financial sector and the 
innovative firms. Second, the agency has the possibility and the authority of monitoring 
and supervising the firm investment. This function could diminish the risk of financing 
firms that seek to divert resources to other uses. Third, the agency tries to select those 
projects have the highest social returns, conditional on being profitable for the firm. 
Under these assumptions, the agency selects projects that are unlikely to be financed 
otherwise. In extreme cases, the funds may finance projects directed toward the creation 
of public research goods, ensuring that firms undertake projects with very high social 
returns but low private appropriability. Thus the two policy goals, mitigating financial 
constraints and supporting investments with a large gap between private and social 
returns, are to some extent blended.   
The presence of the specialized agency marks one of the most important differences 
between TDF and fiscal tax incentives. In the latter case, the firms receive the public 
financing in the form of tax credits or deductions calculated on predefined accounting 
categories. Governments usually adopt these kinds of incentives because they are 
available to all qualifying firms automatically and therefore minimize public interference 
with firm decisions. Indeed, tax incentives do not imply any quality assessment of the 
firm’s R&D expenditure, nor distinguish sectors or specific areas of financing, although 
they may be targeted towards growing or smaller firms in some cases. In addition, 
automatic incentives avoid incurring the costs of establishing an S&T agency, which can 
be high when a country lacks the technical expertise for innovation project assessment.
17
Over time the TDF in the LAC region have adopted matching grants as the most common 
method of financing, abandoning the use of credit lines.
18 The advantage of matching 
grants over credit is that they reduce administrative costs, because they do not require the 
collection of repayments. In addition, matching grants do not require collateral, making 
this option particularly well suited for SMEs and new firms. The disadvantages of 
matching grants relative to credit are the following: i) the financial resources expended 
are not recovered, at least in the short to medium run;
19 ii) grants do not help the firm 
build up a credit reputation in the financial markets; and iii) because they do not need to 
be paid back, matching grants potentially attract more rent seeking firms and therefore 
increase the risk of crowding out own R&D. 
Some TDF include specific lines of financing designed to promote linkages between 
research institutions and firms. In this case the goal of the TDF is not only to subsidize 
the cost of the project, but also to reduce the technical risk as perceived by the firm. In 
                                                 
17 On the other hand, it has to be kept in mind that such incentives will require auditing expertise in the tax 
authority that is knowledgeable about the components of R&D spending. 
18 Another alternative could be public procurement (public contracts). This instrument produces more or 
less the same effect of a subsidy but it has the additional advantage of signaling the market that the 
innovation projects undertaken by the firm do have a market. 
19 In the long run and if the project financed by TDF is successful, the public financial resources should be 
recovered through higher income from corporate taxes. 
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not financially constrained because the project requires it to invest in some technical 
capability or infrastructure that has the nature of a public or semi-public good (such as 
highly specialized laboratory and equipment). Firms may also have the potential to 
discover new investment opportunities from the interaction with scientific institutes and 
research centers, but find the cost of exploring this option too high. In this case, public 
financing seeks to make research infrastructure available to firms and to reduce the costs 
of accessing highly specialized researchers. 
Other specific TDF promote joint ventures and alliances for the performance of 
innovation and research projects. In this case, the rationale for intervention is threefold: 
first, the TDF take advantage of potential economies of scale and scope of the research 
activities. Second, they reduce the problem of private R&D investment duplication 
(Martin and Scott 2000). Although cooperation can degenerate into collusion, it can also 
significantly mitigate the negative effects of both free-riding and duplication of research 
effort. To deal with this trade-off, public programs usually promote firms’ cooperation in 
the first stages of R&D activities and foster competition in a second stage (Martin and 
Scott 2000).
20 Third, the promotion of firm-level research agreements aims at fostering 
interactive learning processes. The interaction with other firms allows a firm to expand its 
knowledge base beyond its own endowment. In this case systemic failures due to 
coordination costs and limited absorptive capacity justify the public financing of firms’ 
networking activities (Maffioli 2005). 
3.2  Other innovation policy interventions  
Only a few of the LAC economies (Argentina, Colombia, Brazil and Mexico) have 
adopted fiscal incentives for technological innovation. These incentives usually include: 
(i) reduction in the corporate income tax; (ii) reduction in the value-added tax; (iii) 
accelerated depreciation of capital goods and equipment acquired in the context of an 
innovation project and (iv) fiscal credit for expenses in R&D. According to Hall (2005), 
the scarce utilization of this policy can be ascribed to some specific features of both the 
instrument and the Latin American context. First, fiscal incentives tend to be expensive in 
terms of foregone tax revenue unless they are incremental, and an incremental fiscal 
credit is very complex to design and administer. Second, to be effective they require 
sufficient corporate tax bills and an efficient tax enforcement system. 
The LAC governments’ attitude towards the strengthening of the intellectual property 
rights (IPR) systems, as required by the TRIPS agreement, has been much more 
controversial. This is probably due to the very nature of this institution. Although the 
importance of the IPR system is widely acknowledged, scholars and policy makers are 
still debating how strong the system should be and how it should evolve in developing 
countries. Advocating stronger intellectual property rights presumes that the combined 
positive impact of the appropriability incentive for the innovator and the disclosure 
element for peers (resulting in greater innovation) outweighs the negative impact of 
temporary market distortions (resulting in higher prices for consumers and slower 
technology diffusion for producers) and the decreased opportunities for learning via 
                                                 
20 For example, in the United States, the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 explicitly exempted 
R&D cooperatives and Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) from antitrust enforcement. 
  12imitation. Therefore, timing becomes the key factor for the IPR policy: protecting IPR 
very early in the technological catch-up process can discourage an important channel for 
technological learning. Failing to protect IPR when private firms are launching R&D 
programs could weaken the incentives to innovate. This only partially explains why LAC 
economies have not yet developed IPR system in line with the TRIPS agreement. Some 
institutional weaknesses could have contributed to this situation as well. Indeed, efficient 
IPR systems require strong institutional capacity and credible enforcement.  
In addition to fiscal measures and IPR reforms, LAC governments have also 
implemented some complementary instruments to strengthen S&T policy. For example, 
Brazil has used governmental procurement to support the national software industries. 
Chile and Brazil have also introduced some pilot programs to promote venture capital for 
innovation projects. Many countries (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua) have 
implemented networking and clusters policies to support the technological upgrade of 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico have 
implemented instruments aimed at attracting Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and at 
promoting linkages with local suppliers.  
4.  Evaluation Strategy, Data Source, and Methodology 
The TDF impact evaluation strategy is inspired by the linear (sequential) models of 
innovation suggested by Pakes and Griliches (1984) and Crepón et al. (1998), which 
describe the relationship between firms’ investment in R&D, innovation output, and 
productivity change. Although the linear model is often critiqued because it omits 
feedback elements in the innovative process, from the perspective of a policy instrument 
like R&D subsidies, the first order impact will be well-captured by this model. In any 
case, the goal of the evaluation was not to estimate the complete model, but to use it as a 
guide to the causality chain that leads from the provision of the subsidy to the R&D 
investment to the innovative outputs and then finally to the performance outcomes.  
Figure 2 summarizes the temporal sequence of events that are involved in the assessment 
of the impact of the TDF. Table 2 summarizes the indicators (both objective and 
subjective) used for evaluation and the sources for the data used for each of them. Note 
that the degree of availability of these indicators varies across programs and countries. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
Before describing the four evaluations in detail, we briefly address the issue of how to 
measure innovation activities and research productivity. Objective criteria of 
innovativeness are the introduction of “new to the market” innovations in certain 
industries (proxied by patents or new product sales) or the quantitative efforts of firms in 
developing innovations (proxied by R&D expenditures). Considering the limitations of 
these indicators in an economic context largely based on small firms, these criteria may 
underestimate the innovativeness of firms and could lead to a misleading perception of 
the innovation process. 
On the other hand, subjective criteria are based on largely on the judgment of participants 
and therefore reflect a more personal perception of innovation capabilities. Such criteria 
usually rely on qualitative information collected via direct surveys. Interviewees are 
  13asked to provide information regarding particular events such as the introduction of 
innovations in the firm, which are not based on quantitative, measurable information but 
on the interviewees’ perception of the issue.
21 Nevertheless, despite this bias, subjective 
criteria may provide a valuable source of in-depth information on firms’ innovation 
activities, especially in some contexts in which the overview of R&D efforts and patent 
activities do not provide a complete view of the innovation phenomenon.
22 For this 
purpose many efforts have been devoted to standardizing the collection of information 
about innovation in firms that is based on both objective and subjective criteria. The most 
successful effort is the methodology proposed and adopted by the OECD.
23  
Given the pros and cons of both subjective and objective measures, the evaluations 
looked at four different levels of impact, involving both types of indicators wherever 
possible. The first level was simply firm expenditures on R&D, in order to determine 
whether they are complements or substitutes for the R&D subsidies, that is, whether the 
subsidy increases the firm’s own spending on R&D. 
The second and third levels of evaluation look at the impact of the subsidy on firm 
behavior and innovative output. As is often pointed out by innovation scholars, when the 
impact of S&T policy is formulated simply in terms of input and output measures, the 
firm is largely treated as a black box and the long run impacts on its own capabilities or 
organization are ignored (OECD 2005). As a partial corrective to this approach, two of 
the evaluations (those for FONTEC in Chile and FOMOTEC in Panama) complement the 
input level analysis with a limited analysis of the TDF impact on firm behaviour. In 
particular, the evaluation looks at (i) process innovation and organizational changes and 
(ii) access to external knowledge resources. 
The innovative output indicators usually employed in the literature are patents, sales of 
new products and the introduction of a new or improved product or process. The studies 
we review here use all indicators where they are available (new product information in 
three cases and patents in three cases), although patents have limitations as a measure of 
innovative output in developing countries.  
The final level of impact evaluation was firm performance, measured as growth or 
changes in sales, employment, exports, and productivity. Unfortunately, the time period 
available for the evaluations was rather short for full impacts on these variables to be felt.  
Each evaluation we review in this paper is based on a unique dataset where both primary 
sources of information, such as the surveys collected in Chile and Panama, and secondary 
sources of information, such as the innovation and industrial surveys used in Argentina 
and Brazil, were merged with the administrative records of the program executing unit. 
                                                 
21 For instance, subjective criteria may refer to the provision of information on the introduction by firms of 
products and processes substantially different from the previously adopted or the introduction of industry 
specific innovations, which are otherwise difficult to identify. This does not imply that the invention of 
products/processes can be considered innovative for the whole industry, but evidences some incremental 
efforts of the firm in improving competitiveness. 
22 This is especially true for industries in which patent activity is low or for SMEs, in which R&D activity 
is normally not formalized. 
23 In 2000 this methodology was adapted to the LAC context by a group of scholars and experts, producing 
the Bogotá Manual.  
  14This procedure allowed to exactly identify the specific firms that participated in the 
evaluated programs. In addition, in all the cases the control group was constructed using a 
sample of firms that did not receive any other comparable treatment, in order to 
maximize the accuracy of the impact estimation.
24  
4.1  Evaluation Methodology 
To measure the impact of TDF on outcome indicators, each individual program-level 
evaluation followed the basic government program evaluation techniques developed in 
the econometrics literature. To the best possible extent, each program has to be analyzed 
using a counterfactual perspective in order to reduce potential selection bias. These 
techniques provide for a rigorous strategy for identifying a statistically robust control 
group of non-beneficiaries, and following both the “treated” and the control group over 
time. The ideal evaluation design is the one that creates a valid comparison group by 
randomly allocating treatment prior to the beginning of the program, which more closely 
guarantees that on average the characteristics of both groups are the same.  
The measurement of programs’ effectiveness poses the well-known “evaluation problem”. 
Define   the average expenses in innovation by firm i in year t if the firm participates 
in the TDF an
C
it  the average expenses by the same firm if it does not participate to the 
program. Measuring the program impact requires a measurement of the difference 
, which is the effect of having participated in the program for firm i. Computing 
 requires knowledge of the counterfactual outcome   that is not empirically 
observable since a firm can not be observed simultaneously as a participant and as a non-
participant. The evaluation will not be able to compute the program impact for an 



















it it E YY, by comparing data on participating and non-participating 
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24 In most of the cases the evaluated programs were the only national sources of financing specifically 
devoted to innovation projects. 
  15The term   in (2) is the average effect of the treatment on the treated 
that we try to isolate. The difference 
|1
TC
it it i EY Y D ⎡ −= ⎣⎤ ⎦
] [| 1 ][| 0
CC
it i it i EY D EY D = −=  is the selection bias: 
besides the effect of the program there may be systematic differences between 
participating and non-participating firms that affect the program’s impact. 
A simple estimator of ∆ using the sample analogue  [ | 1] [ | 0]
TC
it i it i EY D EY D = −=  will 
give an unbiased estimate of the program impact only if there is no selection bias, that is 
only if  . However, participating and non-participating 
firms differ in a number of dimensions (e.g. size) that are likely to affect both the level of 
innovation expenditures and the probability of getting financed through the TDF. 
Therefore, the simple difference in mean outcomes between participants and non-
participants is capturing the effect of program participation together with the impact of 
third factors affecting both the decision to invest in innovative activities and to participate 
in the program. 
[| 1 ][| 0 ] 0
CC
it i it i EY D EY D =− = =
The TDF evaluations follow quasi-experimental designs in all the cases, given that a truly 
randomized design was not implemented for any of the projects reviewed. All the 
evaluations tried to identify comparable treated and non-treated individuals in order to 
minimize the effect of potential “selection biases” on the evaluation results. A control 
group was identified using a number of different methods: propensity score matching 
procedures, difference in differences estimation, fixed effect panel estimation, and 
instrumental variable estimation.
25  
5.  Empirical Results 
This section reports the results of the four levels of the TDF impact evaluation: the TDF 
impact on R&D investment (input additionality); the impact on firm’s innovative 
behavior (behavioral additionality); the impact on patents and innovation outputs 
(innovative output); and the program impact on sales, employment, productivity and 
exports (firm performance). A detailed summary of results and methodologies is given in 
an appendix Table A2. Unfortunately, the heterogeneity of available information and data 
sources did not allow the studies reviewed here to adopt absolutely identical estimation 
techniques for all impact evaluations. As a consequence, results are sometimes not fully 
comparable, and in some cases not even available, for all countries. Nevertheless, they 
offer an unprecedented opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of an important 
component of S&T policy in the LAC region during the past 15 years.  
The evidence shows that TDF do not crowd out R&D investment; on the contrary, in 
many cases they significantly increase firms’ investment in R&D (see Table 3). Based on 
the arguments made earlier, this result implies that the financial constraints faced by 
potentially innovative firms are truly an obstacle to private investment in R&D. In three 
cases we are able to estimate the impact of the TDF on R&D investment net of the 
subsidy: ADTEN, FNDCT and FONTAR-TMP I. In all three cases the evidence shows 
that TDF have multiplier effects, where beneficiaries increase their investment in R&D 
                                                 
25 On these techniques see among the others: Heckman et al. (2000), Blundell and Costa-Dias (2002), Jaffe 
(2002), Smith and Todd (2003).  
  16beyond the amount financed by program funds.
26 Although the stylized framework we 
presented in the beginning rules out such effects, this result is consistent with what was 
expected from the development literature: by providing the opportunity to overcome 
liquidity and credit constraints, TDF programs should allow beneficiary firms to 
undertake projects at the margin of their portfolio and, eventually, to generate the 
technical conditions for undertaking additional innovation projects.  
The clear positive impact of the FNDCT suggests that measures to encourage cooperation 
with public research institutes may be important, as the FNDCT is the only TDF 
evaluated that requires the cooperation between firms and research institutes. This 
particular feature of the program could have contributed to addressing both financial and 
technical constraints (lack of human resources, lack of own specialized research 
infrastructure and lack of technical knowledge, for instance). 
[Table 3 about here] 
Despite the limited evidence of matching-grants effectiveness, the data shows that this 
instrument may be effective for new innovators. In the case of the FONTAR-ANR 
program, although the analysis does not provide evidence of a multiplier effect at the 
aggregate level, the data indicates that new innovators have seen a substantial increase in 
their private investment in R&D. On the other hand, the effect of matching grants is 
smaller for more experienced innovators, for which some evidence of displacement of 
resources has been found. Although some caution is called for, the result is not surprising 
and is consistent with the rationale that led to the implementation of the matching-grant 
scheme and also with the brief theoretical discussion in Section 2 of the paper.
27 
As opinion surveys reflect, it appears that the project beneficiaries are using TDF as a 
signal of firm technical capacity and ability to innovate. Qualitative information collected 
from the beneficiaries in both the Chilean and Argentinean cases reveals that some firms 
are using the programs as a signaling mechanism in order to obtain complementary 
financing from the financial sector. In particular, in the Chilean case the majority of the 
beneficiaries consider the public subsidy an important complementary source of 
financing (50%), probably associated to a helpful signal of the quality of the project to 
get other sources of financing (28%).
28
Opinion surveys also suggest that human resource constraints may be mitigating TDF 
effects. When asked to identify the main difficulties faced during the execution of the 
subsidized project, the majority of the beneficiaries mentioned the lack of skilled labor 
force. This suggests that some sort of underestimation of the human resources required to 
carry out the subsidized project could have displaced other R&D activities originally 
                                                 
26 In the case of FONTEC, where R&D net of subsidy was not available at the firm level, we compared the 
average annual impact with the average annual subsidy received by the beneficiaries, and we found that the 
impact is slightly lower than the subsidy. With the required caution, we concluded that some crowding out 
effects might have occurred, and that there was definitely no evidence of a multiplier effect. 
27 As previously pointed out, one of the main motivations for introducing the matching-grants scheme was 
to offer to those firms with a limited experience in R&D activities a more accessible support than targeted 
credit. 
28 Furthermore, thirty percent of the beneficiaries applied to the program because they believed the project 
would not receive any financing from the private sector. 
  17included in the firms’ work plan. The fact that the participation in the program did not 
have an effect on physical capital investment is quite consistent with the hypothesis that 
the limited impact on R&D intensity is due more to a temporary adjustment in the 
investment decisions rather than to some sort of resource displacement. 
For the Chilean and Panamanian cases the evaluation was able to look at a set of 
indicators of behavioural changes in firms related to innovation (Table 4). Both programs 
had a positive impact on variables such as the firms’ ability to interact with external 
sources of knowledge and financing, which are proxies for significant changes in the 
firms’ innovation strategy. A positive impact of the programs on the introduction of 
process and product innovations was also found. In general, the impacts were more 
significant in Panama than in Chile, although due to the qualitative scales employed, it is 
difficult to compare their magnitudes. 
[Table 4 about here] 
In terms of direct measures of innovative output (patents and sales of new products) the 
evaluation’s results are more disappointing (Table 5). In almost all the cases the 
evaluation does not find any statistically significant positive impact. However, it is worth 
noting that there could be a considerable time lag between program participation and a 
significant change in the traditional measure of innovative output, such as patent 
registrations and the sales of new products. Unfortunately most of the estimates are 
contemporary, based on changes between the year before and the year after program 
participation, due to data limitations. One exception is the Brazilian FNDCT study, where 
it was possible to use patent applications instead of registrations. In this case, the results 
show a clear positive and significant impact of the program on patents applied for.  
[Table 5 about here] 
In terms of firm performance the evidence is mixed (Table 6). The evaluation shows 
mostly positive (although not always significantly so) results on sales and employment 
growth, but the impact on firm productivity is mostly insignificant. In general the pattern 
observed was one of a negative impact on productivity in the year of the reception of the 
funds and the year following that reception, and a positive or insignificant effect 
afterwards. The FONTEC, FONTAR and ADTEN and programs positively affect firms’ 
growth in terms of employment and sales with a lag of two years, but there is no evidence 
of a significant impact of the FNDCT program. In addition, only the FONTEC program 
seems to be effective in promoting firm exports, among those programs for which export 
data was available.  
[Table 6 about here] 
In interpreting these results, especially those in Table 6, it is appropriate to recall the 
analysis given earlier in the paper. Were a true random sample to be analyzed, that 
analysis predicted a lower rate of return to R&D for the firms receiving the subsidy as 
opposed to those that did not receive it. This may or may not translate into differences in 
average productivity growth of the two kinds of firms, as we would still expect that doing 
more R&D would lead to higher productivity growth on average, even if the marginal 
return is lower. But there are good reasons to think that the average effects will be small 
because the marginal return is lower.  
  186.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have provided a meta-review of the econometric evaluation of a number 
of R&D subsidy programs operated during the 1990s by Latin American governments. 
The main conclusions are easy to summarize: the impact of the programs on firm 
behavior and outcomes becomes weaker and weaker as one gets further from the 
immediate target of the policy instrument. There is clear evidence of a positive impact on 
R&D, weaker evidence of some behavioral effects, and almost no evidence of an 
immediate positive impact on new product sales or patents. This perhaps to be expected, 
given the relatively short window over which the impacts were measured, but it might 
bear watching in the future.  
We also found that that different financing mechanisms have varying impacts on 
beneficiary groups. Although in general credit subsidies were more effective than grants, 
for new innovators and small firms matching grants seemed to be more effective, 
possibly because they enabled firms to overcome the fixed cost of starting up an R&D 
program. Matching grants were also effective in the one program that encouraged 
cooperation between firms and university research centers. 
In this concluding section we offer a few recommendations based on what we have 
learned thus far about the performance of these TDF. Some of these recommendations are 
based not on the econometric evaluations per se, but on the supporting material in the 
studies from which this review is drawn.  
The potential crowding in/out of private resources should be monitored carefully, in 
particular when non-reimbursable resources are granted. This would not imply any 
additional burden for the execution of the programs. The present evaluation demonstrates 
that it would be enough to collect some basic economic and financial information on a 
relevant group of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries firms in order to monitor the 
potential occurrence of this phenomenon. Since opportunistic behaviour may arise as a 
consequence of changes in the NIS specific conditions, this activity has to be conducted 
periodically.  
There is no clear evidence that the TDF can significantly affect firms’ productivity and 
competitiveness within a five-year period, although there is a suggestion of positive 
impacts. However, these outcomes, which are often the general objective of the programs, 
are more likely related to a longer run impact of policy. Although it is possible that TDF 
programs do not produce productivity and competitiveness gains, it is also possible that 
these impacts occur over a time frame longer that the five years for which the evaluations 
have data. For this reason, the long run impact of the TDF has to be carefully monitored. 
Follow up evaluations, allowing for larger time lags to analyze the same groups of treated 
and non-treated firms, is strongly recommended. In addition, this result should be 
carefully taken into consideration in the ex-ante estimation of the program’s internal rate 
of return. 
Governments should always consider the inclusion of services that can complement the 
financial support of innovation activities and should be more accurate in defining firms’ 
constraints beyond those of financial nature. Shortage of skilled labour could 
significantly affect firms’ innovation strategy and plan (as could have happened to some 
extent in Chile, for example). The provision of financial support should be complemented 
by measures aimed at tackling other relevant constraints. Governments should promote 
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possibility of directly hiring these specialists. The FNDCT results suggest how the 
interaction between firms and universities can be an effective response to this need.  
This study has to be considered as first step in a wider and more intense effort of 
understanding the effectiveness of the instruments evaluated. For this reason it is highly 
recommended that an evaluation design similar to the one adopted for this exercise be 
applied to supervise the activities of the TDF. In particular, the evaluation design should 
clearly identify: (i) a detailed assessment of the rationale behind the particular policy tool 
adopted, including a description of the country’s specific market failures that the 
instrument would be addressing, and the rationale of the specific selection mechanism 
adopted (i.e. the targeting of the instrument); (ii) the identification of the short, medium 
and long run expected outcomes; (iii) the periodic collection of primary data on the 
programs’ beneficiaries and on a group of comparable non-beneficiaries; (iv) the 
repetition of the impact evaluation on the same sample of beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries so that long run impacts can be clearly identified; and (v) the periodic 
repetition of the impact evaluation on new samples of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
in order to identify potential needs of re-targeting of policy tools. 
For the purposes of the TDF impact evaluation governments should promote a more 
systematic cooperation between the authorities responsible for the TDF and National 
Institutes of Statistics. A significant part of the information needed for a rigorous impact 
evaluation can be generated at a low cost and without any additional organizational effort 
by simply including specific “policy evaluation” sections in the industrial and innovation 
surveys periodically collected in many LAC countries. 
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Table 1: Technology Development Funds Evaluated 
Country and 
period 
Name Tools Mechanism  Beneficiaries 
Argentina (AR) 
1994-2001 
FONTAR-TMP I  Targeted Credit  Open Window  Firms 
Argentina (AR) 
2001-2004 
FONTAR ANR  Matching Grants  Call for Proposals  Firms 
Brazil (BR) 
1996-2003 
ADTEN Targeted  Credit  Open  Window  Firms 
Brazil (BR) 
1999-2003 






FONTEC –Line 1  Matching Grants  Open Window  Firms 
Panama (PN) 
2000-2003 
FOMOTEC Matching  Grants  Open  Window Firms 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
Table 2 – Indicators and Data Sources for TDF Impact Evaluation 
 Evaluation  Questions  Indicator  (type)  Sources  Horizon 
Input 
additionality 
Does public financing crowd out private 
resources? The evaluation looks at the 
impact of the TDF on the beneficiaries' own 
financial resources devoted to R&D and 
innovation activities, as a test for the 
potential crowding out effect of the public 
financing. 











What is the impact of the TDF on the 
innovative behaviour of beneficiaries? The 
evaluation assesses the effectiveness of the 
public financing in inducing a change in the 
behaviour of the beneficiaries and 
increasing their capability of developing 
process and product innovations and 
allowing them to be more connected to the 














What is the impact on innovation capacity 
of beneficiaries? Was a significant product 
or process innovation introduced? Were 
patents applied for? 
Patents;  









What is the impact on competitiveness of 
beneficiaries - change in sales, employment, 
productivity and a share of sales exported? 
An innovative and efficient firm is expected 
to be able to improve its competitiveness in 

















Source: Authors' elaborations       
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Table 3: Input Additionality - Testing for Crowding in / Crowding out Effects 
 Indicator  Impact Signif. Conclusion 
FONTEC (CH)  R&D intensity *  0.74% 10%  No crowding out, but no multiplier 
effect 
FONTAR-ANR (AR)  R&D intensity *  0.18% 5%  No crowding out, but no multiplier 
effect 
ADTEN (BR)  R&D intensity **  0.66% 5%  Positive and significant impact, net of 
subsidy 
FNDCT (BR)  R&D intensity **  1.63% 5%  Positive and significant impact, net of 
subsidy 
FOMOTEC (PN)  R&D elasticity *** 0.28  5%  No crowding out 
 
FONTAR-TMP I (AR)  R&D elasticity 
****  0.15 5%   Positive and significant impact, net of 
subsidy 
 
* Difference-in-Difference [(Treated After-Treated Before) - (Control After – Control Before)] with 
Propensity Score Matching; R&D variable is gross of public subsidy. 
** Single difference [Treated After - Control After] with Propensity Score Matching; R&D variable is net 
of public subsidy. 
*** Panel Data Fixed Effects. Available data do not allow us to test for the presence of a multiplier effect. 
**** Panel Data Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variable; R&D variable is net of public subsidy.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of IDB (2007). 
 
Table 4: Innovative Output and Behavioral Changes 









(strategic relevance on a 1-5 scale)  - 1.45  NS  0.08  5% 
Process innovation  
(strategic relevance on a 1-5 scale)  0.48 10%  0.10  5% 
Financial access  
(improvement on a 1-5 scale)  0.13 10%  0.15 
  1% 
Training & org. activities  
(1-5 scale)  - 0.06  NS  0.05  NS 
Use of external sources of 
knowledge (1-5 scale)  0.10 5%  0.07  5% 
 
Single difference [Treated After – Control After] with propensity score matching.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of IDB (2007). 
 
  27Table 5: Innovative Output 
  Indicator Impact Signif.  Conclusion 
FONTEC (CH)  Number of new patents, 
1998-2002 *  0.15 NS  Positive but not significant 
impact 
   Number of new 
products, 1998-2002*  -1.15 NS  Negative but not significant 
impact 
FONTAR-ANR (AR) 
Sales of new products 
(1000s of pesos), 2001-
2004* 
1013 NS  Positive but not significant 
impact 
ADTEN (BR)  Number of patents, 
1996-2003*  0.87 NS  Positive but not significant 
impact 
FOMOTEC (PN)  Share of sales of new 
products, 2000-2003*  14.2% 1%  Positive and significant impact 
FNDCT (BR)  Number of patents, 
1999-2003*  -1.35 NS  Negative but not significant 
impact 
   Patent applications, 
1999-2003**  14.06  5%  Positive and significant impact 
 
* Difference-in-Difference [(Treated After - Treated Before) - (Control After – Control Before)] with 
Propensity Score Matching 
** Difference-in-Difference [(Treated After - Treated Before) - (Control After - Control Before)] 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of OVE (2007). 
 
Table 6: Performance 
 Indicator  Impact  Signif.  Conclusion 
FONTEC (CH)  Employment (∆%)*  3.1%  10%  Positive, but not significant impact 
   Sales (∆%)*  39.6%  10%  Positive and significant impact 
   Productivity (∆%)*  24.9%  NS  Positive, but not significant impact 
   Exports (% of sales)* 2.7%  10%  Positive and significant impact 
FONTAR-ANR (AR)  Employment (∆%)*  1.5%  NS  Positive, but not significant impact 
   Sales (∆%)*  11.5%  NS  Positive, but not significant impact 
   Productivity (∆%)*  -85.4%  NS  Negative, but not significant impact 
  Exports (% of sales)* -0.1%  NS  Negative, but not significant impact 
ADTEN (BR)  Employment (∆%)*  79.0%  1%  Positive and significant impact 
 Sales  (∆%)*  64.0%  5%  Positive and significant impact 
   Productivity (∆%)*  - 1.0%  NS  Negative, but not significant impact 
FOMOTEC (PN)  Sales**  2.57  NS  Positive, but not significant impact 
 Productivity  (∆%)**  0.14  NS  Positive and significant impact 
  Exports**  41.87  NS  Positive, but not significant impact 
FNDCT (BR)  Employment (∆%)*  12.0%  NS  Positive, but not significant impact 
   Sales (∆%)*  20.0%  NS  Positive, but not significant impact 
   Productivity (∆%)*  27.5%  NS  Positive, but not significant impact 
 
* Difference-in-Difference [(Treated Before-Treated After) - (Control Before - Control After)] with 
Propensity Score Matching 
** Panel fixed effects; amount of subsidy rather than a dummy on the right hand side. 
All “after” indicators are measured two years after the receipt of the subsidy. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of OVE (2007). 
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Table A1 – Knowledge Divide between LAC and G7 (2003 and change 1995 – 2003) 
 
  KEI (1)  EIR (2)  INN (3)  EDU (4)  ICT (5) 
 GAP*  ∆**  GAP* ∆** GAP* ∆** GAP* ∆**  GAP*  ∆**
Latin America  52.5  -2.7  50.4 -9.6 48.9 -3.4 49.5 1.3 61.2  0.1
Argentina 64.1  -4.7  35.4 -36.5 68.8 2.5 87.3 15.8  63.0  -2.7
Barbados 70.8  14.3  72.0 32.3 36.5 -2.6 91.2 11.0 85.1  19.6
Bolivia 42.3  -1.1  54.3 -23.1 18.3 4.5 64.0 18.1 34.8  -5.3
Brazil 60.8  7.7  54.5 -4.5 57.3 6.4 65.9 22.9  65.4  5.6
Chile 80.8  9.7  112.4 24.2 64.6 3.0 73.6 7.9  75.4  4.6
Colombia 45.7  -5.6  40.2 -17.8 37.4 1.8 51.9 1.2  53.3  -8.7
Costa Rica  65.1  -2.4  77.3 3.8 61.1 1.0 49.4 -10.3  73.8  -3.8
Dominican Rep.  36.3  -2.6  42.4 12.4 3.5 -28.7 47.3 -0.4  53.4  8.5
Ecuador 38.0  -1.5  30.4 -15.9 29.1 15.5 44.5 -4.8  48.1  -1.7
El Salvador  42.8  -0.4  66.9 4.0 19.4 -2.5 36.7 -1.9 50.8  -0.3
Guatemala 28.6  9.1  46.5 20.0 5.8 -2.2 25.5 0.5  38.6  19.2
Haiti 17.6  7.7  26.0 22.4 0.9 0.0 13.9 0.7  30.4  8.8
Honduras 26.1  -7.5  39.4 7.6 10.7 -25.5 28.3 -1.2 27.3  -9.4
Jamaica 58.2  -0.3  51.8 -13.6 55.3 -15.0 50.8 6.3  74.2  20.3
Mexico 59.7  0.4  68.1 -7.2 55.3 3.0 51.5 2.3  64.7  2.4
Nicaragua 30.5  5.6  51.4 31.5 8.4 2.1 33.6 -0.1  30.7  -8.6
Paraguay 31.9  -4.5  30.9 -28.4 8.4 3.6 49.1 6.8  40.3  -1.2
Peru 49.4  1.9  46.7 3.4 38.0 -0.3 59.9 -0.4  53.2  5.9
Uruguay 64.1  -7.6  72.4 -13.8 35.2 -21.1 82.8 8.1  67.9  -3.0
Venezuela 46.2  -8.7  13.3 -30.9 51.5 -3.0 61.3 7.1  56.4  -9.3
Notes to table:  
* GAP = [(Value for the country i)/(Value for G7)];  
** ∆ = [GAP2003 – GAP1995]  
(1) KEI = Knowledge Economy Index  
(2) EIR = Economic Incentive and Institutional Regime  
(3) INN = Innovation System  
(4) EDU = Education  
(5) ICT = Information and Communication Technologies.  
Source: World Bank K4D   
Table A2 – Overview of the Case Studies 
Method      Impact variable Covariates *  Interpretation of the impact 
1. Country and Period: Argentina 1994-2001; Program name: FONTAR-TMP I; Data type: Panel; No. of Obs.: 420 x 7; Period of exposure: 1995-2001 
FE** + IV  R&D elasticity (net of subsidy) 
Sales, employment, exports, ratio of qualified 
employees to the total employees 
Additional inst.  = N of offices promoting program 
located in the province of the firm. 
Fixed effects, instrumented. The impact is the within firm elasticity of 
R&D with respect to the subsidy.  
2. Country and Period: Argentina 2001-2004; Program name: FONTAR-ANR; Data type: Panel; No. of Obs.: 414 x 4; Period of exposure: 2002-2004 
DD  with 
PSM*** 
R&D intensity change (gross of subsidy) 
Sales of new products (1000s of pesos) (∆, 
2001 - 2004) 
Employment (∆%, 2001 - 2004) 
Sales (∆%, 2001 - 2004) 
Productivity (∆%, 2001 - 2004) 
Export share of sales (∆, 2001 - 2004) 
Group, sales, the ratio of qualified employees to 
number of employees, economic sector, location 
Difference in difference with propensity score matching. The impact 
is the average difference of the changes in the variables between 
treated and untreated firms that have been matched using the 
propensity score. 
3. Country and Period: Brazil 1996-2003; Program name: ADTEN; Data type: Panel; No. of Obs.: 11.645 x 8; Period of exposure: 1997-2003 
D with  
PSM *** 
R&D intensity (net of subsidy, 2000) 
Sales, firm’s solvency (dummies), firm’s age, 
market share, foreign capital (dummy), exporting 
firm (dummy), economic sector, location  
Differences with propensity score matching. The impact is the average 
difference of R&D intensity between treated and untreated firms that 
have been matched using the propensity score. 
DD  with 
PSM*** 
Number of patents (∆, 1996 – 2003) 
Employment (∆%, 1996 – 2003) 
Sales (∆%, 1996 – 2003) 
Productivity  (∆%, 1996 – 2003) 
Sales, firm’s solvency (dummies), firm’s age, 
market share, foreign capital (dummy), exporting 
firm (dummy), economic sector, location 
Difference in difference with propensity score matching. The impact 
is the average difference of the changes in the variables between 
treated and untreated firms that have been matched using the 
propensity score. 
4. Country and Period: Brazil 1999-2003; Program name: FNDCT; Data type: Panel; No. of Obs.: 15.466 x 5; Period of exposure: 1999-2003 
D with  
PSM *** 
R&D Intensity (net of subsidy, 2003) 
Differences with propensity score matching. The impact is the average 
difference of R&D intensity between treated and untreated firms that 
have been matched using the propensity score. 
DD  with 
PSM*** 
Number of patents (∆, 1996 – 2003) 
Patent applications (∆, 1996 – 2003) 
Employment (∆%, 1996 – 2003) 
Sales  (∆%, 1996 – 2003) 
Productivity  (∆%, 1996 – 2003) 
Sales, firm’s solvency (dummies), firm’s age, 
market share, foreign capital (dummy), exporting 
firm (dummy), economic sector, location   Difference in difference with propensity score matching. The impact 
is the average difference of the changes in the variables between 






31 Method      Impact variable Covariates *  Interpretation of the impact 
5. Country and Period: Chile 1998-2002; Program name: FONTEC; Data type: Panel; No. of Obs.: 439 x 4; Period of exposure: 1999-2001 
DD with  
PSM *** 
R&D intensity (gross of public subsidy) 
Number of patents (∆, 1998 – 2002)  
No. of new products (∆, 1998 – 2002) 
Employment (∆%, 1998 – 2002) 
Sales (∆%, 1998 – 2002) 
Productivity (∆%, 1998 – 2002) 
Export share of sales (∆, 1998 - 2002) 
Difference in difference with propensity score matching. The impact 
is the average difference of the changes in the variables between 
treated and untreated firms that have been matched using the 
propensity score. 
D with  
PSM *** 
Product innovation (relevance,1-5 scale) 
Process innovation (relevance,1-5 scale) 
Financial access (relevance,1-5 scale) 
Training & org.  (1-5 scale) 
Use of external knowledge (1-5 scale) 
Sales, firm’s age, firm’s age square, economic 
sector 
Differences with propensity score matching. The impact is the average 
difference of the variables between treated and untreated firms that 
have been matched using the propensity score. 





R&D elasticity (net of subsidy) 
Sales elasticity          
Productivity elasticity       
Export elasticity 
Share of sales of new products (2000-2003) 
FE: Sales, ratio export sales, average salary, year 
dummies 
PSM: Export share, total employment, firm’s age, 
investment in machinery, economic sector  
Fixed effects. The impact is the within firm elasticity of the left hand 
variable with respect to the subsidy. 
D with  
PSM *** 
Product innovation (relevance,1-5 scale) 
Process innovation (relevance,1-5 scale) 
Financial access (relevance,1-5 scale) 
Training & org. activities (1-5 scale) 
Use of external knowledge  (1-5 scale) 
Ratio export sales, total employment, firm’s age, 
investment in machinery, economic sector 
Differences with propensity score matching. The impact is the average 
difference of  the variables between treated and untreated firms. 
Notes: FE = Fixed effect; D = Difference (compares levels); DD = Difference in Difference (compares growth rates); PSM = Propensity Score Matching; IV = Instrumental Variable  
* In the case of FE models, this column gives the right hand side variables included. For PSM it gives the variables included in the propensity score, which is computed using the values in the year 
before the subsidy began.  
** The impact was calculated through a fixed effect estimation of the following model:  
log(yit) = β1* log(x)it + β2*log( Sit )+ β3* θt + γi + εit
where yit is the level of private R&D investment in innovation of firm i in year t, xit is a vector of observable covariates, Sit is the actual amount received through the program, θt denotes year dummies; γi 
is a firm-specific component common to all firms and εit is an i.i.d. zero mean random variable assumed to be independent of xit. 
*** The impact was estimated as average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT): 
ATT = E[E(Y1 | D = 1, p(x)) –E(Y0 | D = 0, p(x)) | D = 1] 
where Y is the impact variable, D = {0,1} is a dummy variable for the participation in the program, x is a vector of pretreatment characteristics and p(x) ≡ P(D = 1 | x) = E(D | x) is the propensity score. 
In the case of DD, the impact variable is a growth rate (the change in logY or the change in Y). 
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